



## Strategies for Strengthening Public Engagement in Monitoring Integrity Zone Development as an Effort to Achieve Good Local Governance

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### A B S T R A C T

This study aims to analyze strategies for strengthening public engagement in monitoring the development of integrity zones as an effort to improve local governance. A qualitative approach was employed through in-depth interviews and documentary analysis, with research conducted in Solok City and Padang Panjang City, West Sumatra Province. The findings indicate that public participation in monitoring integrity zones remains limited and largely relies on informal mechanisms. Traditional leaders play a crucial role in disseminating information and encouraging compliance with integrity policies, although their involvement is not yet fully supported by a strong legal framework. Strengthening their role through formal regulations could enhance the effectiveness of public participation. Moreover, broader community involvement has the potential to reduce corruption, promote transparency, and reinforce accountability in local governance. This study contributes by providing empirical insights into how local social structures can be leveraged to support public oversight and by offering practical recommendations for policymakers to enhance governance through the synergy between formal and informal actors.

### INTRODUCTION

Since the Reform Era, various efforts have been undertaken by the Indonesian nation to combat the chronic problems of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) at both national and local levels. These efforts have not only taken the form of regulations, policies, and the establishment of institutions designed to prevent and eradicate corruption, but also attempts to foster strong commitments among state officials and the wider society. Since 2011, the Indonesian government has intensified two forms of commitment: requiring all state officials (some extent, the public) to sign an Integrity Pact (PI), and implementing the Integrity Zone Development Program. These two initiatives constitute a follow-up to Presidential Instruction No. 9/2011 on the Action Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption, which was subsequently translated into ministerial regulations by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (PermenpanRB), namely PermenpanRB No. 49/2011 on the Integrity Pact and PermenpanRB No. 60/2012 on the Development of Integrity Zones.

These two regulations essentially form a policy package aimed at preventing corruption within state institutions and public service delivery. The Integrity Pact (PI) is primarily concerned with personal commitments and the conduct of state officials in governance, development, and public service, whereas the Integrity Zone is oriented toward institutional commitments, encompassing the entire bureaucracy and its internal processes. In short, the Integrity Pact is more personal in nature, while the Integrity Zone is systemic.

By the end of 2021, approximately 4,402 government work units had been nominated to receive the WBK/WBBM designation (Corruption-Free Area/Bureaucracy Serving Area), a recognition conferred by the Ministry of Administrative and

Bureaucratic Reform (KemenpanRB) upon strategic service units whose leadership and staff demonstrate strong commitment to fostering an anti-corruption bureaucratic culture and providing excellent public service (PermenpanRB, 2014). Of the 4,402 units nominated in 2021, only 483 were awarded WBK status and 72 achieved WBBM status. Although not all nominated units attained these designations, the numbers reflect progress compared to previous years. The number of units proposed in 2021 increased by 19 percent compared to 2020, when 3,691 units were nominated, up from 2,239 units in 2019 (PermenpanRB, 2014). These figures, however, reveal a considerable gap between policy targets and actual outcomes in the field.

The rationale behind the Integrity Zone Development initiative rests on the conviction that combating corruption through an "iron fist" alone will not yield sustainable results. Aggressive repressive measures are insufficient. Corruption cannot be eradicated solely through punitive sanctions. Accordingly, the Integrity Zone offers an alternative model that is more persuasive and preventive, aiming to reduce opportunities for corruption by promoting systemic integrity. Jeremy Pope (2008) argued that the development of an integrity system is essentially designed to ensure corruption does not occur through mechanisms of oversight and rules of the game that minimize opportunities for misconduct.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Integrity Zone's implementation remains questionable. The 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Indonesia 102nd out of 180 countries with a score of 37/100, while the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) Integrity Assessment Survey (SPI) in the same year reported a National Integrity Index of only 72.4. These figures underscore the persistent gap between the government's normative commitments and the realities of bureaucratic practice.

Several prior studies have also highlighted this issue: (1) [dwiyanto \(2021\)](#) emphasized the weak capacity of bureaucracy in implementing anti-corruption policies; (2) [Prasojo \(2016\)](#) found that bureaucratic reform often becomes trapped in administrative formalities; (3) [Rochman, A., & Widianingsih \(2018\)](#) revealed low levels of public participation in monitoring Integrity Zones; (4) [Haryanto \(2019\)](#) noted the limited role of non-state actors in supporting bureaucratic integrity; and (5) [Nurmandi, A., & Kim \(2020\)](#) pointed out that local governance has the potential to serve as an arena for innovation, but this has been largely overlooked in corruption studies.

From these studies, it is evident that there remains a significant gap regarding how local social structures, particularly the role of traditional leaders, can be optimized to encourage public engagement in monitoring the Integrity Zone. This is where the original contribution of this research lies—introducing a new perspective that highlights the role of non-formal actors in strengthening integrity governance at the local level.

Theoretically, this research adopts the governance theory framework ([Pierre, J., & Peters, 2020](#)), which emphasizes the importance of collaboration between formal and non-formal actors in public governance. This approach is relevant to understanding how traditional leaders can act as intermediaries between formal bureaucracies and the community in monitoring Integrity Zones.

As a systemic effort to prevent corruption within government institutions, Integrity Zone Development has been mandatory for all ministries, government agencies, and local governments since September 2012. Each institution is required to declare its commitment to Integrity Zone Development, beginning with the signing of the Integrity Pact by leaders and staff, followed by public declaration to ensure broad societal oversight, monitoring, and participation in anti-corruption initiatives, bureaucratic reform, and improved public service ([PermenpanRB, 2014](#)).

The key question, however, is whether the signing of Integrity Pacts by all officials and the public declaration of Integrity Zones have significantly reduced corruption in Indonesia. Do these commitments have a deterrent effect on state officials to refrain from engaging in corrupt practices? The CPI data in 2021 revealed that Indonesia remained at rank 102 (out of 180 countries surveyed) with a score of 37/100, only slightly below India at rank 86 (score 40). Similarly, the KPK's SPI survey covering 639 ministries, agencies, and local governments in the same year reported a National Integrity Index of just 72.4 (on a 0–100 scale). These results suggest that corruption continues to occur within the bureaucracy despite moral pledges and legal sanctions. The Integrity Pact and Integrity Zone declarations appear to function more as ceremonial gestures rather than effective deterrents against corruption, collusion, and nepotism.

This raises a critical concern: is the moral integrity of state officials in Indonesia so fragile that the Integrity Pact (a pledge of honesty) and the Integrity Zone fail to provide sufficient deterrence against malpractice and maladministration in governance, development, and public service? These issues and questions form the basis for why this research is necessary.

The research questions are as follows: (1) How is public participation manifested in monitoring the development of Integrity Zones at the local level? (2) What role do traditional leaders play in strengthening such public participation? and (3) What strategies can be pursued to enhance the effectiveness of public oversight of Integrity Zones?

The objective of this research is to analyze public participation in monitoring Integrity Zone development and to examine the role of traditional leaders in reinforcing local governance. The urgency of this study lies in its contribution to offering locally rooted strategies to strengthen the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Thus, it provides novelty by conceptualizing the synergy between local social structures and national policy in Integrity Zone development.

## METHOD

This study employs a qualitative approach to gain an in-depth understanding of public participation strategies in monitoring Integrity Zone development at the local level. This approach is chosen to explore the experiences, perceptions, and practices of relevant actors, which cannot be adequately captured through quantitative data alone.

Primary data were obtained through in-depth interviews with purposively selected key informants, including local government officials, traditional leaders, civil society representatives, and academics with knowledge of governance issues. The main selection criterion was direct involvement in or relevant knowledge of Integrity Zone implementation in the research locations. Secondary data were collected through documentary studies of regulations, official reports, and publications related to the Integrity Zone program.

The research sites were Solok City and Padang Panjang City, both in West Sumatra Province. These two cities were chosen for their comparative advantages in implementing local governance practices. Solok City was selected because it had declared itself an Integrity Zone and received recognition for best public service from the Ombudsman in 2022. Meanwhile, Padang Panjang City was selected because it ranked among the national top ten in 2020 for its use of the Monitoring Center for Prevention (MCP), with a score of 87.93%.

Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis, involving the identification, categorization, and interpretation of patterns emerging from interviews and documentary data. Data validity was ensured through source and method triangulation, while conclusions were drawn inductively based on empirical findings in the field.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Local Government Policies, Programs, or Activities in Monitoring the Development of Integrity Zones

The development of Integrity Zones (ZI) has been a national mandate for all Ministries/Agencies and Local Governments since 2012. Its implementation begins with the signing of the Integrity Pact (PI), which functions as a moral pledge and the basis of commitment for officials to perform their duties with honesty, transparency, and accountability. However, the effectiveness of the PI largely depends on its follow-up through programs, the establishment of oversight units, and community involvement ([PermenpanRB, 2014](#)).

The development of Integrity Zones as a systemic effort to counter and prevent corruption within government institutions was in fact mandated to be implemented by all Ministries/Agencies and Local Governments no later than the end of September 2012. Each Ministry/Agency and Local Government is required to declare the initiation of Integrity Zone development within their institutions, starting from the stage of signing the Integrity Pact (PI) by the leadership and all staff, and then

publishing it openly before the public, with the aim of enabling all stakeholders to monitor, safeguard, oversee, and participate in corruption prevention, bureaucratic reform, and improvement of public services.

As observed in Solok City, integrity zone oversight is carried out by the Regional Inspectorate, which supervises Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) under the Solok City Government. Solok City held the signing of the integrity zone declaration at the City Hall in 2019, attended by all heads of municipal offices. However, the Integrity Movement Unit (UPI) as an oversight body has not yet been established. Instead, the Inspectorate has formed the Gratification Control Unit (APIP) to monitor OPDs, while the Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI) from community elements has also not been formed. This is mainly because the OPDs directly related to integrity zones are service-oriented agencies, such as the Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil) and the Investment and One-Stop Services Agency (DPMTSP).

The progress of ZI programs implemented by Solok City Government has been carried out by the relevant Technical Implementation Units. Based on interviews with the Regional Inspectorate of Solok City, it was found that there are no specific policies or programs designed by the City Government to involve the public in the process of developing and monitoring the Integrity Zone. Public participation in this context remains normative and under the authority of each OPD, following the regulations and guidelines set by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform. In this case, the Regional Inspectorate serves as a supervisory body, not as an executor of public empowerment programs within the Integrity Zone.

The Regional Inspectorate of Solok City, as the technical executor of the Integrity Pact, has carried out its duties and authority in implementing PI programs, including the creation of a Gratification Control Unit managed by APIP. However, the Integrity Movement Unit (UPI) has not yet been established by the Inspectorate, nor has the Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI) from community representatives. Thus, key indicators of the Integrity Zone's success have not been met, since both UPI and FPI play a vital role in monitoring the performance of OPDs in Solok City.

The Civil Registry Office) of Solok City, as a service-oriented OPD, has acknowledged and participated in the signing of the Integrity Pact to support the City Government. Disdukcapil has also implemented anti-corruption programs, with the success of ZI development being measured through process indicators of these activities. Sixteen ZI programs have been implemented by Disdukcapil, while four other programs belong to the City's Human Resources Development Agency (KPSDM), unrelated to Disdukcapil's work programs. The researcher notes that Disdukcapil has successfully implemented ZI processes by completing 16 out of 20 programs in 2022.

From this, it can be concluded that Solok City Government has completed the first stage of ZI development, namely the signing of the Integrity Pact. Essentially, the Integrity Pact is a moral pledge to perform duties and responsibilities according to prevailing regulations. As explained by Barbara Kilinger (2007) in her book *Integrity: Doing the Right Thing for the Right Reason*, integrity is defined as: "Integrity is personal choice, an uncompromising and predictably consistent commitment to honor moral, ethical, spiritual, and artistic values and principles." Therefore, through the Integrity Pact,

Solok City Government has pledged to carry out all stages toward developing an Integrity Zone.

In the second stage, each OPD must implement ZI programs and establish integrity institutions. The Solok City Inspectorate has formed the Gratification Control Unit to prevent OPDs from receiving or providing gratifications as work compensation. Meanwhile, Disdukcapil has implemented 16 out of 20 ZI programs, showing significant progress in ZI implementation among OPDs in Solok City.

In the signing of the Integrity Pact, Solok City Government involved *Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Minangkabau* (LKAM) and *Bundo Kandung* as customary community organizations, from the formulation stage up to the signing. According to the head of LKAM, they were also engaged as an Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI), although not formally appointed by decree (SK), but only through organizational involvement after the signing. This contrasts with the statement of the Regional Inspectorate, which noted that no formal SK has been issued by the Mayor or OPD heads to establish an FPI.

In practice, LKAM and Bundo Kandung are consistently involved in weekly evaluation meetings. If there are reports from the public about maladministration or issues with mayoral policies, the LKAM head conveys them during evaluation meetings with the Mayor. This aligns with the concept of *Public Engagement* as articulated by Barnes & Mann (2011), which defines it as "proactive efforts to involve people in deliberating public issues and in helping to solve public problems."

Civil society organizations (CSOs/NGOs) are also key stakeholders in ZI monitoring. They can act as watchdogs and collaborators with the local government to ensure the success of ZI programs. However, according to research informants, the NGO *Peduli Nusantara Sumbar*, which monitors local policies in Solok and West Sumatra, has not been involved in ZI oversight. This finding is consistent with statements from the Regional Inspectorate that an Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI) has not yet been established, and that NGOs have not been engaged in the monitoring of ZI.

From the perspective of service users, it was found that only government circles and related stakeholders are aware of the Integrity Pact and ZI development. The general public largely does not know about the Integrity Pact or ZI signed by the Solok City Government. Further questioning revealed that many informants had no knowledge of these initiatives. This suggests that information campaigns about ZI, WBK, and WBBM have only reached stakeholder levels within the city government, not the wider public. Ideally, the general public—who are the primary users of government services—should also be informed so they can serve as evaluators of whether OPDs are meeting ZI criteria.

This situation reflects what Cheema & Rondinelli (2007) describe as the conditions for *democratic governance*: (1) the availability of institutional frameworks for all citizens to participate in political and economic processes, and (2) efforts to promote the recognition of human rights and core societal values. The researcher argues that Solok City Government has not yet achieved the ideal of democratic governance outlined by Cheema and Rondinelli, as it has not fully enabled all layers of society to participate in political and economic processes, which are integral to ZI development.

A different situation was found in Padang Panjang City. The signing and declaration of the Integrity Pact is regarded as both a

symbol and a moral pledge to perform duties in accordance with existing regulations. The Integrity Pact serves as a tool for government, private companies, and the public to prevent corruption, collusion, and nepotism, especially in public contracting. Its signing is not a mere formality, but rather a step to accelerate the creation of a clean and trustworthy bureaucracy, thereby increasing public trust.

Once signed by a Ministry, agency, or local government, every individual within that institution is expected to consistently uphold moral, ethical, and spiritual principles in their daily actions to prevent all forms of corruption.

Data collection in this study involved two main groups: government officials and the community. Interviews with officials included the Inspectorate and the Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil) of Padang Panjang City. Meanwhile, community-level interviews were conducted with traditional leaders, service users, NGOs, and local media representatives.

According to Rico Candra, Sub-Coordinator of Planning, Evaluation, and Reporting at the Padang Panjang Inspectorate, all OPDs in Padang Panjang have signed the Integrity Pact and declared ZI development, thus committing to preventing corruption within the city government.

However, awareness of the Integrity Pact and ZI declaration is uneven among the public. Some community members, especially stakeholders, are aware, while the general public is not. Those aware typically include members of organizations such as the *Kerapatan Adat Nagari* (KAN), the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI Padang Panjang), and certain NGOs, as they were present during the signing and declaration events. Conversely, ordinary citizens who did not attend these events remain uninformed.

For example, one service user at Disdukcapil, Varhan, stated: “I don’t know, I’m not sure which agencies have signed.” This indicates that the concept of ZI has not been comprehensively understood by the public, resulting in low levels of citizen participation in monitoring. Public understanding remains limited to stakeholders, while even some officials lack full comprehension.

Barriers to broader community involvement include limited technological literacy. As governance increasingly relies on digital platforms, citizens who are less adept with technology struggle to access information and services related to ZI.

Thus, the researcher concludes that in Padang Panjang, public knowledge of PI and ZI remains limited to certain prioritized groups. In accordance with PermenpanRB No. 60/2012, each Ministry/Agency and local government is required to implement 20 specific programs. According to data from [ppid.padangpanjang.go.id](http://ppid.padangpanjang.go.id), the Padang Panjang City Government has implemented all 20 required programs.

As for specific policies and programs designed to involve the community in ZI monitoring, Padang Panjang has established initiatives such as “Rumah Aspirasi” and “Lapor Wali.” *Rumah Aspirasi* provides a platform for citizens to submit reports, complaints, or suggestions directly to the city government, either in person or through designated offices. *Lapor Wali* is a complaint channel accessible via telephone, allowing citizens to report grievances directly to the Mayor’s office.

Disdukcapil of Padang Panjang also provides a formal complaint channel through the LAPOR system, which can be accessed via SMS (1708), the website ([www.lapor.go.id](http://www.lapor.go.id)), or through guidance on proper reporting procedures. Additional

channels include suggestion boxes, official email ([pengaduan.dukcapilpp@gmail.com](mailto:pengaduan.dukcapilpp@gmail.com)), and informal reporting through social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Citizens can also file complaints directly with Disdukcapil officers. As one staff member, Laswani, stated: “At *Dukcapil*, we have a complaint service, consultations, and designated officers.”

It should also be noted that every Ministry/Agency and local government is required to establish both an Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI) from community members and an Integrity Movement Unit (UPI) tasked with providing administrative and technical support to prevent corruption. However, in Padang Panjang, neither UPI nor FPI has yet been established. This was confirmed by both government officials and community informants, including service users, traditional leaders, journalists, and NGO representatives—all of whom stated they had never been invited to join such a forum.

In summary, not all segments of society are aware of the policies, programs, or initiatives related to ZI. Awareness is generally higher among stakeholders, while the broader public remains uninformed. Specifically, programs such as *Rumah Aspirasi* and *Lapor Wali* are not widely known by ordinary citizens, limiting their role as mechanisms for community involvement in ZI monitoring.

**Table 1. Comparison of Integrity Zone Implementation in Solok City and Padang Panjang City**

Aspect	Solok City	Padang Panjang City
Integrity Pact Signing	✓ (2019) involving local government agencies (OPD) and customary leaders	✓ (all local government agencies/OPD)
Integrity Driving Unit	✗ Not established	✗ Not yet established
Independent Monitoring Forum	✗ Not established	✗ Not yet established
Formal Channels	UPG, Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil) channels (WhatsApp, website)	<i>Rumah Aspirasi</i> (Aspiration House), <i>Lapor Wali</i> (Report to the Mayor), LAPOR, email, social media
Informal Channels	Weekly meetings with customary leaders	Personal relations with government officials
NGO Participation	Low, not involved	Limited, only specific stakeholders
Public Socialization	Low, limited to stakeholders	Low, majority of the public unaware
Integrity Zone Program Achievements	16 out of 20 programs (Disdukcapil) implemented	All OPDs signed Integrity Pact, several Integrity Zone programs implemented

Research Findings In Solok City, the local government has not yet established specific policies to involve the public in monitoring the Integrity Zone (ZI). Oversight functions remain centralized in the Regional Inspectorate through the

Gratification Control Unit (UPG), while the Integrity Driving Unit (UPI) and Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI) have not been established. As a result, public participation is largely symbolic, limited to weekly evaluation forums with traditional leaders (LKAM and Bundo Kanduang). Nevertheless, the Solok City Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil) has implemented 16 out of 20 ZI programs, indicating significant progress in corruption prevention through public service reforms. However, the lack of NGO involvement and low public outreach have hindered the optimization of public oversight (see Table 1).

Meanwhile, Padang Panjang City has launched the *Rumah Aspirasi* and *Lapor Wali* programs as formal complaint channels, further supported by the LAPOR platform, suggestion boxes, email, and social media. Despite having more diverse reporting mechanisms, public participation remains low due to limited outreach and the dominance of informal channels based on personal connections with officials. These findings align with Kim & Lee's study, which emphasizes the importance of inclusive public communication for ensuring that e-government and digital platforms are effectively utilized by citizens.

### Channels for Monitoring the Development of the Integrity Zone

In this subsection, the authors describe the complaint channels provided by the Solok City Government and the Padang Panjang City Government to capture public aspirations, record and evaluate performance, receive reports from citizens, and follow up on them. These mechanisms are expected to facilitate effective public involvement in the development of the Integrity Zone (ZI).

The Solok Regional Inspectorate has provided both formal and informal complaint channels for the public. Each channel follows a different procedure: formal complaints are directly handled by the Regional Inspectorate, while informal complaints are first managed by the Solok Communication and Information Office (Kominfo) before being forwarded to the relevant Regional Apparatus Organizations (OPD) for implementation. Informants stated that the Inspectorate has not encountered significant obstacles in involving the public, as any report received—especially those concerning OPDs—is processed promptly. However, OPDs engaged in service delivery tend to face greater challenges in responding to citizens' complaints.

The Civil Registry Office (Disdukcapil) of Solok City has also provided both formal and informal complaint channels with different mechanisms to facilitate citizens in reporting issues. Based on the archived records of complaints submitted via WhatsApp and the official website, most issues reported were administrative in nature. Disdukcapil demonstrated responsiveness by addressing these complaints on the same day they were submitted. Nonetheless, as a service-oriented OPD, Disdukcapil often encounters difficulties, particularly when citizens file complaints through incorrect channels—reflecting limited public awareness of the designated reporting mechanisms despite ongoing promotional efforts by the agency.

The complaint channels established by the Solok Regional Inspectorate and Disdukcapil align with those commonly discussed in public engagement literature, particularly Barnes and Mann, including: (1) city or town hall meetings, (2) neighborhood councils, (3) online forums, and (4) community surveys. These channels are designed to remain accessible at all times rather than being incidental, ensuring that citizens'

problems, reports, and suggestions are promptly addressed. According to the authors, this reflects the Solok City Government's efforts to facilitate citizen involvement in the public sector.

From the perspective of community stakeholders in Solok, such as traditional leaders and NGOs, these mechanisms demonstrate that public engagement emerges organically from citizens' own awareness rather than being imposed by the government. Complaint channels essentially serve as instruments for managing relationships between individuals or groups and the state. However, a challenge remains in ensuring that the general public—beyond core stakeholders—understands and recognizes their role in monitoring the ZI. The state is therefore expected to provide greater space for citizens to participate actively in governance, development, and public service delivery. In this sense, public engagement is not only a mechanism for participation but also an indicator of democratic governance. By fostering public engagement, the state demonstrates a commitment to strengthening civil society and building trust between government and the public.

The Solok City Government signed an Integrity Pact in 2019 and has since initiated ZI development processes. The Solok Regional Inspectorate has exercised its supervisory function by establishing a Gratification Control Unit (UPG) managed by the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP). However, an Independent Monitoring Forum (FPI)—a community-based body designed to oversee ZI implementation—has not yet been established. These two institutions are critical pillars of ZI development as outlined by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (KemenPanRB). Thus, the establishment of an FPI remains an urgent task for the Solok Regional Inspectorate.

As part of this study, Disdukcapil was selected as a sample OPD. The office has signed an Integrity Pact and implemented 16 out of 20 ZI programs, which can be regarded as a significant achievement in promoting integrity-based governance at the OPD level. Disdukcapil has provided multiple reporting channels that have been effectively utilized by citizens, although occasional misuse of these channels indicates a need for greater public awareness.

Key stakeholders, including NGOs and representatives of traditional institutions such as LKAM and *Bundo Kanduang*, have demonstrated awareness of the Integrity Pact and ZI development initiatives. In contrast, general citizens—based on fieldwork samples—remain largely unaware of these programs, highlighting a communication gap.

In Padang Panjang, public involvement in ZI development has relied more heavily on informal channels. Although the local government has established formal platforms such as *Rumah Aspirasi* and *Lapor Wali*, citizens tend to prefer informal mechanisms, particularly those based on personal relationships. In practice, this means that reporting and complaint processes are often facilitated by direct connections between citizens and officials within relevant government units.

The predominance of informal channels reflects insufficient public outreach regarding the available formal mechanisms. This represents a key shortcoming of the Padang Panjang City Government in encouraging public engagement in ZI development. Therefore, the government, together with community stakeholders, must strengthen collaborative efforts

to enhance public interest and participation in the integrity-building process.

### Models and Strategies for Strengthening Public Engagement in the Implementation of Integrity Zone Development at the Local Level

Based on interview data from both Padang Panjang and Solok, it is evident that mechanisms for public involvement in monitoring and developing Integrity Zones (ZI) largely rely on informal channels. The lack of adequate socialization of formal channels provided by local governments has become a key weakness in both cities, limiting efforts to encourage public participation in ZI development. Furthermore, collaboration between the government and society—particularly with stakeholders—remains essential in fostering broader public interest in the process.

Dissemination and reinforcement of public understanding by local governments play a crucial role in realizing effective ZI development in both cases. Field data indicate that the dissemination of information regarding ZI monitoring and development has stagnated within a narrow segment of society, particularly among traditional leaders or clan heads. This knowledge has not been effectively extended to the wider public, even though general citizens represent a fundamental element for ensuring the success of ZI development.

To address this, it is important to begin with strengthening the understanding of traditional leaders. Once adequately informed, these leaders can function as facilitators within their communities, ensuring that information about ZI monitoring and development is more accurate and clearly conveyed to the broader population. Conversely, if traditional leaders possess only partial or fragmented knowledge, they may face challenges in effectively transmitting information to their constituencies.

Thus, the recommended model and strategy for fostering greater public engagement in ZI development in Padang Panjang and Solok is to prioritize the reinforcement of traditional leaders' capacities. These leaders can then act as intermediaries in broadening societal understanding of citizens' roles in ZI monitoring and implementation. Moreover, local governments should emphasize the responsibility of traditional leaders as extensions of government efforts to disseminate information on public engagement. This responsibility may be institutionalized by granting legitimacy or formal authority to traditional leaders as partners of local governments in promoting ZI awareness within their respective communities.

The analysis further shows that while formal channels exist in both cities, their utilization remains limited due to insufficient outreach. In Solok, most complaints are administrative in nature and submitted via WhatsApp or the Disdukcapil website, although these reports are often misdirected. In Padang Panjang, *Rumah Aspirasi* and *Lapor Wali* are better known among stakeholders than among the general public. This situation underscores a communication gap between government and citizens. As Barnes and Mann argue, effective public engagement must be proactive, inclusive, and capable of reaching all social groups, not only elites.

A comparative analysis of the two cases reveals that public involvement in ZI oversight remains elitist, concentrated among traditional leaders, stakeholders, and OPDs. In fact, service users should be the primary actors in monitoring, as they are the most

directly affected by the quality of public services (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).

Accordingly, strategies to strengthen public engagement may include:

1. **Capacity building for traditional leaders** as trusted government partners in ZI socialization, reflecting the finding that citizens place greater trust in them as sources of information.
2. **Establishing Independent Monitoring Forums (FPI)** grounded in civil society, involving NGOs, local media, and vulnerable groups.
3. **Optimizing digital channels** (e.g., LAPOR, social media, mobile applications) by expanding outreach and enhancing citizens' digital literacy.
4. **Integrating formal and informal complaint mechanisms** through a unified complaint management system, ensuring that citizen reports are not limited to stakeholder voices but reflect broader public input.

Through these strategies, this study demonstrates that public involvement in ZI oversight remains limited but can be strengthened through a collaborative model based on traditional leaders, inclusive formal mechanisms, and the optimization of digital literacy.

### CONCLUSION

This study finds that both the Solok City Government and the Padang Panjang City Government have provided formal and informal channels for the public to submit complaints, reports, and aspirations. Padang Panjang City offers *Lapor Wali* and *Rumah Aspirasi* as formal channels, while Solok City relies more heavily on deliberation mechanisms facilitated by traditional leaders and civil society organizations. However, the effectiveness of public engagement remains limited due to low levels of outreach and the dominance of informal mechanisms.

Practically, strengthening the role of traditional leaders through formal legitimacy granted by the government can serve as an effective strategy to enhance public participation. Traditional leaders, who hold social authority, may function as intermediaries between the government and the community, thereby ensuring that the oversight of Integrity Zone development is more inclusive. Theoretically, these findings enrich the literature on public engagement and local governance by highlighting the role of local cultural actors in anti-corruption governance.

In relation to models and strategies for public participation in overseeing Integrity Zone development, emphasis should be placed on granting legitimate authority and responsibility to traditional leaders in both municipalities. The purpose of this delegation is to ensure that their role as government intermediaries is formally legitimized by the wider community. Consequently, the dissemination of information regarding public engagement in Integrity Zone oversight and development will be better received and supported by society, resulting in outcomes that align more effectively with policy objectives.

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